INTRODUCTION
THISPAPER PROVIDES an analytical framework for infinitely repeated games with discounting, introducing a number of concepts which organize the theory in a natural way. I consider, in particular, the set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria (see Selten (1965 Selten ( , 1975 ) of such games. Progress in understanding these equilibria has been impeded by the fact that, in principle, they may be extremely complex. My results provide a major dimensional simplification: they show that every pure strategy (subgame) perfect equilibrium path is the outcome of some perfect simple strategy profile. Such strategy profiles have a very elementary structure. Moreover, they are extremely tractable; it may be easily checked whether or not they are perfect.
The theory developed here builds on the seminal work of Aumann and Shapley (1976) and Rubinstein (1979) on infinitely repeated games without discounting. In particular, it borrows from their work the fundamental idea of punishing a player for not participating in the punishment of another player. In other respects, however, their techniques do not extend; the latter depend in an essential way upon the possibility of trading future losses one-for-one against present gains. With the introduction of discounting, intertemporal trade-offs are more subtle, and detailed shapes of punishments become important. While discounted repeated games are delicate in this respect, realism demands that they be investigated. Indeed, in most economic applications, the assumption of a zero interest rate is inappropriate; we are typically concerned with situations in which the future is less important than the present.
Much of the analysis of this paper is couched in terms of outcome paths or punishments. A path (or punishment) is an infinite stream of one-period action profiles. I view a strategy profile as a rule specifying (or prescribing) an initial path and punishments for any deviation from the initial path, or from a previously prescribed punishment. The remarks to follow are to be understood in terms of this definition. It is equivalent to the standard one (see Section 4) but the appropriate formulation for the perspective taken here.
The incentive constraints implicit in a perfect equilibrium may be quite subtle. For instance a player who is being punished for a deviation may have "myopic" incentives to cheat (i.e., the action stipulated by the equilibrium may not be a single-period best response, in one or more stages of the punishment (path)). If so, perfection requires that he be deterred from cheating by the threat of a further punishment. This problem reappears at the next level and one is led into a hierarchy of punishments. Reflecting this complexity, an arbitrary strategy profile may be contingent on history in essential and elaborate ways. It may involve an infinity of punishments and a complicated rule specifying which punishment is imposed for any particular deviation from the initial path or from an ongoing punishment.
Much of this potential complexity is in fact redundant. As indicated earlier we need only consider simple strategy profiles. These are simple in that they are history-independent in the following strong sense: they specify the same punishment Q' for any deviation, after any (previous) history, by player i. They are thus defined by the initial path, n player-specific punishments, where n is the number of players, and the simple rule described above.
A central concept of this paper is the notion of an optimal penal code. An optimal penal code is an n-vector of perfect strategy profiles, the ith strategy profile of which yields the i th player at least as low a payoff as does any other perfect equilibrium. Optimal penal codes provide a simple criterion to determine whether a path is the outcome of a perfect equilibrium; their existence underlies the results obtained here. A simple penal code is an n-vector of strategy profiles defined by an n-vector of punishments (Q1,.. . ,Qn). The initial path of the kth strategy profile is Q~, and Qi is imposed if player i deviates (singly) from any ongoing punishment QJ. The notion of a simple penal code permits an elementary proof of the existence of an optimal penal code. The key result is that there exists a simple penal code which is an optimal penal code. The sufficiency of simple strategy profiles follows as an easy consequence.
The assumption that payoffs are discounted is an essential element of the proof that an optimal penal code exists. Without discounting, existence is not assured: a player may be minmaxed (i.e., forced down to his one-period individually rational payoff) for T periods for any finite T, but possibly not forever. This nonexistence is related to the fact that the Aumann-Shapley-Rubinstein strategies involve punishments whch are history-dependent and whose severity depends on the pattern of previous deviations.
My results make it unnecessary to contemplate complex hierarchies of punishments; in no sense is there any need to "make the punishment fit the crime." Optimality might demand that a deviant "cooperate" in his own punishment (see Abreu (1986) ). The theorem on simple penal codes implies that he may be persuaded to do so simply by threatening him with the punishment already in effect. This appears paradoxical. How can a player be deterred from cheating when he is already being punished as severely as possible? The appropriate resolution is that in such situations, the early stages of an optimal punishment must be more unpleasant than the remainder. The results do not imply the absence of subtle interactions. Rather, they clarify that all relevant complexity resides entirely in the structure of the n punishments (Q1,. ..,Qn).
I present my results for pure strategy equilibria of the repeated game. All mixed strategy equilibria could be obtained within the framework developed here if players in the stage game have access to randomizing devices the outcomes of which become common knowledge concurrently with the players' actions. In this case a player's strategy set in the stage game could simply be taken to be his set of mixed strategies. If randomizing devices are observed with a lag, or not at all, my results do not extend, as they depend on deviations being detected with certainty before the next period's play. Unobservable mixed strategies lead to a significant change in the nature of the analysis, and this presents a very attractive area for further research. It should be understood in what follows that the equilibria to which we refer are pure strategy equilibria, though the theory also encompasses the "observable" mixed-strategy case.2
Earlier work on repeated games with discounting (see, for instance, the classic paper by Friedman (1971) ) has concentrated on paths supportable by CournotNash punishments, i.e., players revert to single-period Cournot-Nash equilibrium behavior forever if a deviation occurs. Coumot-Nash reversion, while subgame perfect, is not in general optimal, and will therefore only suffice to support a limited range of perfect equilibrium behavior. The theory developed here is 'I would like to thank Bob Anderson for first bringing up the issue of mixed strategies and pointing out that these might lead to more severe punishments. A referee stressed the relevance of "observable" mixed strategies.
relevant only when one is attempting to design perfect penal codes more severe than Cournot-Nash reversion. Such an exercise is critical for any study of extremal equilibria. Examples of the latter include maximal collusion in a repeated oligopolistic game or eficient contracts in repeated principal-agent problems.
The next section provides a simple example whch illustrates some of the main ideas. The reader might find it useful to return to it after reading Sections 3-5, which contain the formal analysis. Section 6 concludes. Roughly speaking, G1 may be thought of as a symmetric, discrete, quantity-setting duopoly game in whch each firm may choose a "low," "medium," or "high" output level. It has a unique Nash equilibrium (M, M). Denote by G,"(6) the infinitely repeated game associated with the stage game G,, where S is the discount factor used to evaluate payoffs. Suppose one wished to support the "collusive" outcome (L, L) in a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. The standard way to attempt to do so is to revert to the one-shot Nash equilibrium forever if a deviation occurs. More generally, let a' be a perfect equilibrium of G,"(S), which we would like to think of as a "punishment" for player i. Now, one could support (L, L) if the gain from cheating were outweighed by the loss associated with reverting to a' rather than continuing with (L, L), i.e., if where Gi(ai) is the repeated game payoff to player i from the strategy profile a'. (Notice that first period payoffs are discounted.) As may be checked, for 6 < 5/8, Cournot-Nash reversion is not severe enough to support (L, L). Fix 6 = 4/7. The lower are Gl(al) and C2(a2), the easier it is to support "collusion," and one might hope that the optimal penal code (&, _ a 2 ) will be severe enough to do so. My results imply that in looking for optimal penal codes it suffices to restrict attention to simple penal codes, as described in the introduction (see also Definitions 1and 3 of Sections 4 and 5 respectively). For a two player game, such penal codes are defined by a pair of outcome paths (Q1, e 2 ) , and this restriction may be exploited together with the particular structure of the one-shot game to determine the optimal punishment paths explicitly.
AN EXAMPLE
In our example it turns out that define an optimal simple penal code (_a1, _a2). In words, the play described by Q' is: play (M, H ) for one period (i.e., player 1 plays M and player 2 plays K)
followed by (L, M ) thereafter. Similarly for Q2: play (H, M ) for one period followed by (M, L) thereafter. The strategy profile _a1 specifies that play proceeds according to Q' until some player i deviates singly from this arrangement. If player 1 deviates, his "punishment p a t h Q1 is restarted: (M, H ) is stipulated in the period after the deviation, followed b y T~, M ) thereafter. If player 2 deviates, e2is imposed following the deviation. In general the response to any deviation (by player i alone) from whatever path is in force is to impose Qi starting the period after the deviation3 The description of _a2 is identical except that we now start with Q2. Note that when player 1 is being punished, if he doesn't play M in the first round, player 2 will play H following the deviation and will continue to do so until player 1plays M. Only by "taking his medicine" and playing M can player 1 move play to the more attractive part of the path Q', namely, rounds 2,3,. . . . Why does player 2 play H when he would rather p l a f~ against M by player I ? Because if he does not do so, the regime will change to Q2 and player 2 will himself be punished. And so on. These remarks are meant toconvey the flavor of the rather subtle incentive structure of these equilibria. To pin thngs down exactly, Proposition 1of Section 4 is very helpful-perfection may be verified by checking "one-shot" deviations alone (i.e., deviations followed by conformity with the strategy profile in question). It is useful now to note that Ci(_ai) = 0, i.e., the path Qi yields player i a payoff of zero (when 6 = 4/7 which was assumed earlier). Txus a one-shot deviation is followed by a post-deviation payoff of zero. T h s turns out to be a sufficient deterrent. For instance, suppose Q1 is in force and the players are in the first period of the path. If player 2 deviates (optimally) he gets a payoff of 76 = 4 (I discount first period payoffs) today and a future payoff of zero; if he conforms he gets 5 today and 15 thereafter, i.e., a present discounted value of (100/7) > 4. If, on the other hand, player 1 deviates optimally, he gets zero today and a zero payoff in the future which, as noted earlier, is exactly his payoff from conforming. The other cases may be checked directly. Thus _ai, i = l , 2 is a perfect equilibrium. Since player i can guarantee himself a payoff of zero by playing L in all contingencies, he cannot receive a lower payoff in any perfect equilibrium. Hence (_a1, _a2) is an optimal penal code. Finally, note that (_a1, a 2 ) indeed supports (L, L).
'Simultaneous deviations d o not affect future play, that is, they go unpunished. See Section 4 for a discussion of why this is appropriate.
I have developed a discrete example with numbers that "work" for expositional reasons. In a continuous setting one could construct optimal simple penal codes using outcome paths with the same structure as -Q1, -e2above, for a neighborhood of values of 6. Now M and H would be defined as functions of 6. For an extensive application of this paper in conventional continuous-action oligopoly models, see Abreu (1986) .
NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
The notation and definitions presented below are adapted from Rubinstein (1979) .
The Stage Game
The stage game is denoted 6 = ({Si):=l: {T,):;=,) where N = (1, . . . ,n ) is the set of players, 3, is a pure strategy set for player i, and q:S, x S, x . . . x ,S, 4 R is player i's payoff function. Assume that Si contains at least two elements.
Elements of S, are denoted qi and are referred to as actions. Set S = Sl x S, X . . . X Sn, q = (q,, q,, . . . ,q,), and T = (T,,9,. that whenever . . ,.rr,). Note player-subscripted symbols are used, the corresponding unsubscripted symbol refers to a Cartesian product or a vector, depending on context. I assume that G is simultaneous in order to abstract from problems of perfection in the stage game.
The Repeated Game
Let Gm(S) denoie the supergame with discounting obtained by repeating G infinitely often, and evaluating payoffs in terms of the discount factor S E (0,l). A pure strategy for player i is denoted a,. Each a, is a sequence of functions ui(l), a,(2), . . . ,a,(t), . . . , one for each period t. The function for period t determines player i's action at t as a function of the actions of all players in all previous periods. Formally, a,(l) E S, and for t = 2,3,. . . ,a,(t): St-' 4 S,. Player i9s strategy set is denoted Xi, and E = 2, X 2, x . . . x 2 , , denotes the set sf strategy profiles.
A stream of action projles (q(t))?=, is referred to as a path or punishment and is denoted by Q. Let 52 I Smdenote the set of paths. Any strategy projle a E 2 generates a path denoted Q(a) = {q(1~)(t));.3=~, and defined inductively as follows: q(a)(l) = a(l), and q(a)(t) = a(t)(q(a)(l), . . . ,q(a)(t -1)). Let u,: 52 + R define the ith player's payoff from a path Q E 9: u,(Q) = and;L.==,61.rr,(q(t)), let 6,: 2 -+ R be the ith player's payoff function: Ci(a) = u,(Q(a)>. Note that I am discounting to the beginning of period 1, and that period t payoffs are received at the end of period t. I assume that all players have the same discount factor; t h s assumption is made for notational convenience and plays no role in the analysis.
Let M = ( q ( l ) ,. . . ,q(t)) E S' denote an arbitrary t-period history, and a \ , E 2 the strategy profile induced by a on the subgame following H. For definitions of Nash equilibrium and (subgame) perfect equilibrium, see Rubinstein (1979) .
I assume throughout that the set of payoffs of the stage game is bounded:
SIMPLE STRATEGY PROFILES
Tliis section analyzes a particularly simple class of strategy profiles, simple strategy profi'es. Before giving a definition, I discuss how strategy profiles may be described in terms of paths and deviations from previously specified paths. In general such a formulation might be unnecessarily cumbersome; for simple strategy profiles, however, it is the natural way to proceed.
Implicit in 'any strategy profile is a notion of initial and subsequent deviations from behavior specified by a. In the absence of deviations, conformity with a results in the infinite sequence of action profiles given by the path Q(a). Any particular deviation (diKerent players might deviate, at distinct times and to varying extents) from Q(u) leads into a particular subgame; a induces a strategy profile and, therefore, a path on t h s subgame. A subsequent deviation from this secondary path is possible; this leads to another subgame, another induced strategy profile and another path which becomes the new standard with respect to which conformity with a is determined; and so on, for higher order deviations.
Thus a strategy profile may be viewed as a rule specifying: (i) an initial path Q ( u ) E a;(ii) paths Q" E il after every particular deviation from an ongoing path Q' E a,depending on all that came before that ongoing path.
A noninitial path may be thought of as a "punishment." It is imposed for deviating from an ongoing path. 'The latter may be the initial path or itself a punishment.
Observe that Q" may depend not only on Q' and the particular deviation from it, but more generally on the entire history of previously prescribed paths or punishments and deviations from them. Indeed, the punishments which the Aumann-Shayley-Rubinstein strategies employ are history dependent in a nontrivial way. Punishments are tailored to "fit the crime," and the argument that such strategies are perfect depends critically on thls construction.
A simple strategy profile on the other hand, is completely defined by an (n + 1)-vector of paths (Q', Q', . . . ,Qn) and a very simple rule. The initial path is QO, and each Qi, i E N, is a player-specific punishment. Any deviation by player i alone from any ongoing prescribed path (the initial path or one of the n punishments) is responded to by imposing Qi. Simultaneous deviations are ignored (i.e., go unpunished). Since the equilibrium notions employed in this paper are noncooperative, it is sufficient to restrict attention to the deterrence of uncoordinated (among players) deviations: punishments designed for groups of simultaneously defecting players are irrelevant. Note for later use that u"(a(QO, Q1,. . . , Qn))= v(QO).
The notion of a one-shot deviation appears frequently below. A one-shot deviation from a E 2 (by some player j), involves an initial deviation from Q(a) (by player j), followed by conformity with a thereafter.
Given our interest in perfect equilibria, the "simplicity" of a strategy profile must be judged in terms of how easy it is to verify whether it is perfect. Perfection is in general a difficult criterion to apply because (i) we need to check that the strategy profiles induced by all hstories are Nash equilibria; and (ii) it is a nontrivial exercise to determine whether any given strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. In particular, for any player, both a single deviation from the initial path, and all conceivable patterns of successive deviations from subsequently prescribed paths, must not yield a higher payoff.
In terms of the perfection criterion, simple strategy profiles are very simple indeed. We have to consider only (n + 1) induced strategy profiles and need only check one-shot deviations from each of these. This is the content of Proposition 1. It asserts that the simple strategy profile a(Qo, Q1,. . . ,Qn) is perfect if and only if no one-shot deviation by any player j E N from Q', i = 0,1,. . . ,n, yields him a higher payoff, given that he and all other players will conform with Q j after the deviation. That one-shot deviations suffice follows from an important principle of dynamic programming. This is the criterion of "unimprovability." (See the seminal work of Howard (1960) and, for an account of more recent elaborations, Whittll. (1983) .) For arbitrary a t h s criterion is still cumbersome to apply, as it requires that one-shot deviations from paths induced after all histories need to be checked. Simple strategy profiles are simple precisely because there are at most (n + 1) distinct paths to consider.
Why is Proposition 1 true? The argument is straightforward as the following verbal discussion suggests. Consider a(Qo, Q1,. . .,Q") and suppose that no one-shot deviation by any player from any of the (n + 1) paths yields him a higher payoff. The way simple strategy profiles are constructed, any deviation by player j E N results in QJ being imposed. Suppose that QJ has just been imposed. Since QJ is restarted after any deviation by j and since one-shot deviations do not yield a hlgher payoff, no finite sequence of deviations by j from QJ will. However, given discounting and a uniform upper bound on payoffs (Assumption I), if an infinite sequence of deviations is profitable, then a large enough finite sequence will be as well. Thus, under our hypothesis, player j cannot do better than conform with QJ once it is imposed. But now it is clear that player j will conform with Q', i = 0,1,... ,n, since a deviation from Qi results in QJ being imposed, from which, we have just argued, no further deviation is profitable.
The following notation is convenient: W uJ(Q; t + 1) = Gsr,(q(t + s ) ) .
s = l
That is, aJ(q: , q-,) is the change in player j's stage-game payoff when he plays q,? instead of q, and the other players play according to q, and u,(Q; t + 1) is the present discounted value of player j's payoffs in periods t + 1 to co along the path Q. The subscript "-j" is used consistently to denote a profile with a missing j t h element. Paths and the action profiles of whlch they are comprised are associated in a natural way: Q i = {qi(t))T=l,, -Q'= {qf(t)};"=,, etc. Proposition 1 can now be stated. Since a, specifies the action q,k(t) in state qkj(t), the inequalities (1) assert that a, is unimprovable. Hence (see Theorem 2.1, Chapter 24, Whittle (1983) , or Proposition 7, Chapter 6, Bertsekas (1976)) a, is optimal, i.e., aJIH is a best response to a_, 1 , for all histories H E St', t' = 0,1,2,... . This establishes sufficiency.
Necessity follows directly from the fact that all states are reachable after some hstory.
Q.E.D.
OPTIMAL PENAL CODES
In this Section I define an optimal penal code, and establish my main result: There exists a simple penal code whlch is an optimal penal code. Thus optimal penal codes are shown to exist and are also characterized. An important implication of this theorem is that a path QO is the outcome of a perfect equilibrium if and only if it is the outcome of some perfect simple strategy profile. Hence the perfect equilibrium paths of Gm(6) may be completely analyzed in terms of simple profiles.
Let ZtP denote the set of perfect equilibrium strategy profiles of Gm(S). The associated sets of perfect equilibrium paths and payoffs are denoted f i P = { Q ( a ) la E 2' ' ) and V = {u(Q)l Q E Q P ) , respectively. ASSUMPTION 2 P is nonempty. 2:
A simple condition whlch implies the above is that the one-shot game G has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium q e E S. Denote by a' the strategy profile according to which player i plays qf after all histories. It may be easily checked that a' is a perfect equilibrium.4 DEFINITION2: An optimal penal code is an n-vector of strategy profiles (gl,. . . , g n ) such that for all i , c ' E~P and fi,(?') = m i n { f i l ( u ) l u~~p ) . Note that ?' will in general be diflerent from j + i; the "worst" equilibrium from one player's point of view need not be "worst" from another's.
Let gi inf { 5,(u)1 cr E ZP ). Of course, if an optimal penal code exists, _vi -
( g 1 ) .
Optimal penal codes are important because they lead to a simple characrerization of the set of perfect equilibrium paths; see Proposition 4 below.
I now define a simple penal code.
DEFINITION 3: Let ui(Q1,. ..,Qn>-u(Qi, Q1,. . . ,Qn). The simpie penal code SPC ( e l , .. . ,Q n ) is the H-vector of strategy profiles (ul(Q1,. .. , Qn),..., u"!Q1,. . . ,Q")).
Notice that a simple penal code is defined by an n-vector of outcome paths (as opposed to (n + 1)for a simple strategy profile) and that the components of the n-vector of simple profiles which define a simple penal code differ only in the initial path they prescribe.
Simple penal codes, like simple strategy profiles, are appropriately named. In particular, by Proposition 1, every strategy profile of SPC (Q1,.. . ,Qn) is perfect if and only if no one-shot deviation by any player j from Q', i E N , yields him a higher payoff given that he and all other players will conform with QJ after the devj ation.
DEFINITION 4: SPC (Q1,..., Qn) is an optimai simple penal code if it is an optimal penal code.
Weaker sufficient conditions which exploit the intertemporal structure of the problem could also be formulated. This isme is, however, best addressed in the context of the particular features of the one-shot game G in question, and is somewhat peripheral to the main objectives of the present paper. This is offered to avoid legitimate confusion; an optimal simple penal code is optimal among the class of all penal codes, simple or otherwise.
Lemma I leads to the main theorem.
LEMMA 1: If Q is a perfect equilibrium path, then
ol,(q,% q-J(t)) < u,(Q; t + 1) -c , PROOF: Consider a E 2 P such that Q(a) = Q. Let H* denote the history (q(lj,. . . , q(t -I),(97, q-,(t))). Let a,* denote the strategy a,*(s) = a,(s), s # t, aJ*(t)(H) = q?, for all H E St-'. Since a is a Nash equilibrium, Finally, since a E: 2 p , a 1, * E ZP, and GJ(o 1, * ) >, g,.
Proposition 2 establishes the existence of an optimal penal code. A comment of Jacques CrCmer (1983) greatly simplified my original proof, and recently Harris (1984) has, independently of CrCmer, provided a very similar argument. All these proofs exploit in an essential way the idea of a simple penal code and the one-shot deviation criterion of Proposition 1. The following standard assumptions, which imply Assumption 1,are used in the proof of Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 expresses the main idea of the paper. It indicates how an optimal simple penal code may be directly constructed from an arbitrary optimal penal code. To do so one simply extracts the equilibrium path of each strategy profile of an optimal penal code; the n-vector of paths so obtained defines an optimal simple penal code.
PROPOSITION 3: Let (a1,.. .,a n ) be an optimal penal code and Q' -= Q(ai), i E N. Then (Q1, -. . . ,-Q " ) dejnes an optimal simple penal code. The centrality of optimal penal codes is attested to by the next result whch indicates how an optimal penal code may be used to characterize the set of perfect equilibrium paths. It provides a "converse" to Lemma 1 under the additional assumption that an optimal penal code exists. Note that the hypotheses of Proposition 2 are sufficient, but not necessary, for existence. define an optimal simple penal code. Lemma 1 applied to Q' yields the inequalities (2), for all i E N. Together with the inequalities above, Proposition 1 now implies that o(QO, -Q', . . .,-Qn) is a perfect equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
The two preceding proofs directly imply that simple strategy profiles suffice to obtain all perfect equilibrium paths. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a general framework for analyzing the set of perfect equilibrium paths of infinitely repeated games with discounting. Essential to this framework is the concept of an optimal penal code, and the two related notions of a simple penal code and simple strategy profile. Conditions are given under which there exists a simple penal code which is an optimal penal code. An implication of this result is that discounted games may be completely analyzed in terms of simple strategy profiles. Simple strategy profiles, like simple penal codes, are "simple" in the relevant sense: they may be easily checked to be perfect. In particular, only one-shot deviations from at most (n + 1) outcome paths need be considered.
The theory developed here does not apply to the undiscounted case. Optimal penal codes are in general not defined there, and simple strategy profiles do not suffice to generate all perfect equilibrium outcome paths.
he results of Abreu (1986) for a class of oligopolistic supergames, demonstrate how the general framework presented here can be exploited, and suggest that the optimality and simplicity approach could be usefully applied to other repeated economic models with discounting. In particular, the somewhat unimaginative reliance on Cournot-Nash reversion to support cooperative behavior does not seem tenable on theoretical or pragmatic grounds. These results also illustrate an important general point which was mentioned in earlier sections. Optimality might require that a deviant "cooperate" (in a one-period sense) in his own punishment. Whereas in the undiscounted model, the possibility of "cooperative" deviants is a redundant nicety, it is often critical in a world with discounting. This point does not seem to have been appreciated before. It is in a sense counterintuitive, particularly in view of the result on simple penal codes. The puzzle is resolved by recognizing that optimal punishment paths may be hghly nonstationary: specifically the early stages of an optimal punishment must yield the player being punished a lower (average) payoff than the subsequent stages. This property has a very sharp expression in the oligopolistic quantity-setting games studied in Abreu (1986) .
Analogues to the theorems established here ought to appear in any model with discounting and a "repeated" structure. Finally, the conceptualization of strategy profiles in terms of paths and deviations from prescribed paths should prove useful in other contexts. 
